Nominal Wage Adjustment, Demand Shortage and Economic Policy by Ono, Yoshiyasu & Ishida, Junichiro
Discussion Paper No. 760 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOMINAL WAGE ADJUSTMENT, 
DEMAND SHORTAGE AND 
ECONOMIC POLICY 
 
 
Yoshiyasu Ono 
Junichiro Ishida 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
November 2009 
 
 
The Institute of Social and Economic Research 
Osaka University 
6-1 Mihogaoka, Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047, Japan 
 
Nominal Wage Adjustment, Demand Shortage and
Economic Policy∗
Yoshiyasu Ono† and Junichiro Ishida‡
November 2009
Abstract
We formulate nominal wage adjustment by incorporating various concepts of
fairness. By applying it into a continuous-time money-in-utility model we ex-
amine macroeconomic dynamics with and without a liquidity trap and obtain
the condition for persistent unemployment, and that for temporary unemploy-
ment, to occur. These conditions turn out to be critical, since policy implications
significantly differ between the two cases. A monetary expansion raises private
consumption under temporary unemployment but does not under persistent un-
employment. A fiscal expansion may or may not increase short-run private con-
sumption but crowds out long-run consumption under temporary unemployment.
Under persistent unemployment, however, it always increases private consump-
tion.
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1 Introduction
We extend the fair wage model of Akerlof and Yellen (1990) to a continuous-time dy-
namic model of a monetary economy as portrayed by Keynes (1936, chap.17). Various
concepts of wage fairness are incorporated to this framework to provide a microeco-
nomic foundation for sluggish nominal wage adjustment. In this setup, we find that
persistent unemployment may arise in the presence of a liquidity trap and obtain the
condition for persistent unemployment, and that for temporary unemployment, to oc-
cur. These conditions turn out to be critical, since effects of fiscal and monetary policies
on aggregate demand are shown to be quite different between the two cases.
When analyzing unemployment, whether temporary or permanent, we must con-
sider sluggish price/wage adjustment, viz. the Phillips curve,1 since any possibility of
demand-supply imbalance would intrinsically be avoided without it. Ono (1994, 2001)
presents a dynamic optimization model of a monetary economy with sluggish nominal
wage adjustment and shows that unemployment persists in the steady state if there is
a positive lower bound of the marginal utility of liquidity. This setting, which captures
Keynes’s notion of a monetary economy,2 has recently been used in various analyses of
persistent stagnation.3 All of these previous studies, however, simply take the original
Phillips curve as given, leaving the nominal wage adjustment process as a complete
black box.
Since the original Phillips curve sorely lacks any microeconomic foundation for the
1As an alternative to the sticky-price approach, Mankiw and Reis (2002) propose a sticky-
information model where information diffuses slowly through the population.
2Keynes (1936, chap.17) defines a non-monetary economy as an economy where there is no asset
such that its liquidity premium remains strictly positive.
3For example, Matsuzaki (2003) finds the effect of a consumption tax on effective demand in the
presence of poor and rich people. Hashimoto (2004) examines the intergenerational redistribution
effects of the public pensions system in an overlapping generations framework with the present type
of stagnation. Ono (2006) extends the model into a two-country framework and analyzes the spillover
effects of fiscal spending. Johdo (2006) considers the relationship between R&D subsidies and un-
employment. Rodriguez-Arana (2007) examines the dynamic path with public deficit in the present
stagnation case and compares it with that in the neoclassical case. Johdo and Hashimoto (2008) in-
troduce FDI into a two-country model with the present stagnation mechanism and analyze the effect
of the corporation tax on employment in each country. Murota and Ono (2008) find that a preference
for money holding as status is insaiable and thus generates persistent stagnation of the present type.
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nominal wage adjustment process, several attempts have been made to augment it in
this direction: among most notable are the New Classical Phillips curve, the New Key-
nesian Phillips curve and the hybrid of the two.4 Models along this line include e.g.
Yun (1996), Woodford (2003), Gali (2008), Dotsey et al. (1999), Golosov and Lucas
(2007) and Gertler and Leahy (2008). The first three assume Calvo’s staggered pricing
while the others adopt the menu cost approach. They examine firm and household
reactions to a policy or parameter shock that occurs in the middle of the initial period.
Since they assume that agents cannot revise prices or wages in the middle of each pe-
riod, demand-supply imbalances arise in the initial period but disappear in subsequent
periods. Krugman (1998) also analyzes Japan’s stagnation using a two-period model
in which prices are rigid only in the initial period and any demand shortages disappear
in the second period.
What is common among these studies is that they preclude the possibility of de-
mand shortages in the steady state, almost by construction.5 The logic of unemploy-
ment in this existing literature is indispensably based on the assumption that there
is a period within which prices and wages cannot be revised. According to this logic,
unemployment is necessarily a temporary phenomenon which occurs only in the ad-
justment process, as any demand shortages would eventually dissipate once people’s
expectations are corrected and prices are completely adjusted. Therefore, although
certainly insightful in understanding short-run fluctuations, these existing settings face
serious difficulties in explaining long and persistent recessions because, for them to oc-
cur, it must be either (i) that people continuously make false expectations about prices
or (ii) that the price/wage adjustment process is extremely slow. Neither appears to
be a likely cause for persistent recessions, such as the Great Depression of the 1930s,
Japan’s lost decade of the 1990s, and many other prolonged economic downturns which
we observe every now and then.6 In many of those instances, the recessions persisted
4See Woodford (2003) for properties of these Phillips curves.
5In these settings, the existence of demand shortages implies that the deflation rate cumulatively
expands. If this were to continue, prices would reach zero within a finite time and the feasibility
condition would eventually be violated.
6See Kehoe and Prescott (2007) for many “great depressions” of the twentieth century.
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for more than a decade, which should be more than enough for people to adjust ex-
pectations correctly. It is also implausible to think that the price/wage adjustment
process is so slow that even after all these years, prices and wages cannot be adjusted
to the equilibrium levels to clear the markets.
It is our view that, to account for long and persistent deviations from full employ-
ment, we need an alternative framework where the presence of unemployment does not
hinge on unexpected events or policies. To illuminate this point, we construct a model
of perfect foresight with no unexpected shocks where everyone precisely understands
the current state of the economy.7 Moreover, we adopt a continuous-time setting which
inherently has no border of periods: at any point in time, firms are free to set any prices
and wages, so that there is no “adjustment” in this particular sense. We instead con-
sider a nominal wage adjustment process which rests on workers’ inherent concerns
for fairness. This adjustment mechanism is introduced to a dynamic general equilib-
rium setting to provide our own version of the Phillips curve with its microeconomic
foundation: in the current variation, the inflation rate is governed by the liquidity pre-
mium, the subjective discount rate and the unemployment rate; in particular, around
the steady state, the inflation rate depends only on the unemployment rate, as in the
original Phillips curve.
Within this framework, we show that unemployment due to demand shortages may
persist in the presence of a liquidity trap, thereby pointing to a specific route through
which persistent recessions arise as an equilibrium phenomenon. Aggregate demand
falls short of its full-employment level because people hold onto liquid assets, viz.
money, in the shadow of a recession, which in turn stagnates aggregate demand. The
driving force behind persistent unemployment is hence our perpetual and insatiable
carving for money, whereas the role of nominal wage rigidity is fundamentally different
from the previous models: in fact, while the insatiable demand for money is the di-
rect cause of persistent unemployment, nominal wage rigidity works more as a buffer,
7Obviously, this is not to say that expectations play no role in aggregate fluctuations; they most
certainly do. What we argue here is rather that unemployment could persist even under perfect
foresight where there are no surprises.
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preventing the economy from falling into a catastrophic disaster. Given this construc-
tion, we identify conditions that delineate persistent and temporary unemployment and
show that policy implications differ substantially between the two cases: that is, what
works under temporary stagnation may not work under persistent stagnation. In light
of these findings, we argue that different sets of remedies may be needed to restore full
employment once the economy gets stuck in the state of persistent stagnation.
Despite all the advancements made over the past years, it still remains to be a
daunting task to fully understand the underlying mechanism of prolonged recessions
which we face from time to time. The main aim of this paper is to contribute to this
long-standing issue, especially focusing on why recessions, once started, often persist
for so long. On a grand scale, this paper shares a lot with the New Keynesian paradigm
in its motivation and fundamental approach: we turn to Keynes as the source of insight
on malfunctioning economies.8 The problem is that his book “The General Theory of
Employment, Interest, and Money” is painfully convoluted, and critical insights are
scattered throughout the book in a rather unstructured way. Still, many attempts
have been made to pick up pieces of his insight and reduce them down to their essence.
An emerging consensus seems to be that the crux of Keynesianism lies in various sorts
of market imperfection, especially nominal rigidity, whose effects are amplified through
the effect of aggregate demand.
We have no intention of arguing with this general consensus in this paper, as there
is little doubt that nominal rigidity constitutes a critical component of Keynes’s theory.
It is our stance, however, that nominal rigidity alone does not exhaust all of Keynes’s
insight. We argue that there is an overlooked aspect of his theory that is of independent
importance, i.e., the role of insatiable liquidity preferences. This paper is an attempt
to recast and revitalize this insight in a modern macroeconomic framework to derive its
dynamic policy implications. Although this insight has somehow escaped economists’
8Several prominent economists make this point rather emphatically. Greg Mankiw notes “If you
were going to turn to only one economist to understand the problems facing the economy, there
is little doubt that the economist would be John Maynard Keynes.... His insights go a long way
toward explaining the challenges we now confront (New York Times, November 28). “The Keynesians
basically got it right,” says George Akerlof (2007).
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attention, especially in a rigorous context, we believe that the current framework sheds
light on a different side of Keynesianism and provides a useful prescription of prolonged
recessions.
2 The wage dynamics
Before we set up a dynamic optimization problem, we first illustrate the wage adjust-
ment process which describes how nominal wages are determined in this economy. As
stated, the driving force behind this whole process is workers’ inherent concerns for
fairness. Having derived the equilibrium wage dynamics we then incorporate it into a
dynamic general equilibrium framework to close the model in the next section.
2.1 The setup
There are continua of identical workers and firms, both with unit measure. At any
instance, each worker is either employed or unemployed. Since firms are all identical,
unemployed workers are randomly assigned to firms whenever vacancies exist: as a
consequence, each firm hires workers of equal size in any equilibrium. Let x(t) denote
the number of workers newly hired at time t which is constant across firms. Moreover,
define X(t) as the aggregate rate of employment X(t) ∈ [0, 1], where X(t) = 1 means
that the economy is in the state of full employment.
Although employed workers can in principal quit and leave their respective firms at
will, workers must incur some flow cost while they are unemployed.9 We assume that
the cost of unemployment is prohibitively large, so that workers would not choose to
voluntarily leave their firms when there is a positive probability of being unemployed.
This means that their mobility is heavily influenced by the aggregate rate of employ-
ment: workers are perfectly mobile when X(t) = 1, but they are virtually held up by
their respective firms when X(t) < 1. These assumptions are made for clarity and
tractability rather than for realism.10
9The cost of unemployment is meant to capture physical costs of job search as well as more
psychological costs of anxiety or social stigma inherently attached to unemployment.
10All we need is the fact that workers’ mobility is more limited when there are more unemployed
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In this model, since both firms and workers are identical and there is no informa-
tion asymmetry, job separations occur only for exogenous reasons (no voluntary job
separations on any equilibrium path) as long as unemployment exists. We assume that
each employed worker randomly separates from the current firm at Poisson rate α. The
aggregate rate of employment is then obtained as
X(t) =
Z t
−∞
x(s)eα(s−t)ds. (1)
The time differentiation of (1) yields
X˙(t) = −αX(t) + x(t). (2)
Note that when X(t) = 1 and x(t) = α, full employment continues. Throughout the
analysis, we restrict attention to the case where α is relatively small so that ρ > α.11
2.2 Wage setting
At each instance t, each firm i ∈ [0, 1] offers a (take-it-or-leave-it) wage w(i, t) > 0 that
applies equally for all of its employed workers. Define
W (t) ≡
R 1
0
σ(i)w(i, t)diR 1
0
σ(i)di , (3)
as the economy-wide average wage, where σ(i) is the weight given to firm i. When
unemployed, each worker receives unemployment benefits b(t), which we later normalize
to zero for all t.12
We suppose that workers in this economy have a strong preference for being treated
fairly, and their motivation and productivity depend heavily on this fairness concern.
To be more precise, let ω(t) denote the nominal wage level that is perceived as fair
by employed workers at time t: in what follows, we simply refer to ω(t) as the fair
workers waiting for job offers and the expected duration of unemployment is longer. Our assumptions
should thus be viewed as a way to capture this aspect of reality in an analytically tractable manner.
11If the job-separation rate α is regarded as the rate of death as a worker, it is naturally less than
the subjective discount rate ρ.
12The presence of unemployment benefits plays no role in the analysis, but it helps clarifying the
definition of the fair wage which we discuss next.
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wage. When w(i, t) ≥ ω(t), each worker perceives that the current wage is “fair” and
produces θ (per unit of time); when ω(t) > w(i, t), each worker perceives that the
current wage is “unfair” and produces nothing by withholding work effort. Note that
this specification is a variant of the fair wage-effort hypothesis, put forth by Akerlof
and Yellen (1990), which posits that a worker’s productivity goes down when the wage
level dips below what is perceived as fair.
2.3 The fair wage
Under this setup, what becomes critical is how workers develop the perception of
fairness. At a general level, since fairness is inherently a distributional concern, it
should be subject to various kinds of social comparisons. While it is undoubtedly true,
what social comparisons can imply is potentially very broad and somewhat vague.
More restrictions are thus needed to pin down a tightly specified process of fairness
formation. To do this, we build on the following four popular views in social psychology
and behavioral economics:
1. The entitlement effect: Once a high wage is offered, people develop a sense of
entitlement which persists over time (Falk et al., 2006).
2. The anchoring effect: One’s perceptions, preferences and valuations are initially
malleable but, once imprinted, become fairly persistent over time (Ariely et al., 2003).
3. Opinion-based transmission of perceptions: Others’ perception of fairness influences
one’s own perception of fairness (Folger and Kass, 2000; Umphress et al., 2003).
4. The belief in the just world: People are motivated to help others who have been
treated unfairly, to make the world fair and just again (Lerner, 1980).
For illustrative purposes, we momentarily consider a discrete-time version of the
model where each firm hires new workers and revises its wage contract at interval of
∆t, i.e., at time t ∈ T ≡ {..., t0 − ∆t, t0, t0 +∆t, ...}. We posit that the fair wage in
this economy is computed through the following two-stage process.13
13Note that the current specification is a way, possibly among some others, to capture the four
aforementioned views in a unified form.
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First Stage: At any t ∈ T , workers can be classified into either one of the three
classes: remaining workers who continue to be employed, incoming workers who are
newly hired, and unemployed. The fair wage is computed mainly from the viewpoint
of the remaining workers. First, those remaining workers have in mind a (common)
wage level, denoted by ν(t), that they are rightfully entitled to. Taking this as the
basis, they also take into account the well-beings of unemployed workers (the just-
world hypothesis).14 The fair wage at time t0 is obtained as the average, weighted by
the number of each class of workers, of these concerns:
ω(t0) = ν(t0 −∆t)X(t0 −∆t)(1− α∆t) + b(t0)(1−X(t0))
1− x(t0)∆t , (4)
where the denominator equals the total number of the remaining workers and the
unemployed, as is clear from (2). At this point, the incoming workers, with no prior
work experiences, basically have no idea of what is supposed to be fair and simply accept
and internalize their predecessors’ view (opinion-based transmission of perceptions).
Second Stage: Immediately after time t0, the incoming workers are quickly assimi-
lated into the remaining workers. With new wage contracts in effect, all the employed
workers, both remaining and incoming, then readjust their perception ν(t). Two fac-
tors enter into this readjustment process: on one hand, their perception is influenced
to some extent by the current average wage (the entitlement effect); on the other hand,
it is also influenced by their past perceptions (the anchoring effect). Given this, their
adjusted perception is obtained as
δW (t0) + (1− δ)ω(t0) = ν(t0)X(t0) + b(t0)(1−X(t0)), (5)
where δ ∈ [0, 1] measures the relative salience of the entitlement effect.
The fair wage is shaped by going through this two-stage process repeatedly over
time. Since we normalize b(t) = 0 for all t, combining (4) and (5) yields
ω(t0) = (δW (t0 −∆t) + (1− δ)ω(t0 −∆t))(1− α∆t)
1− x(t0)∆t , (6)
14Since workers are all homogeneous and unemployed workers are simply unlucky to be in that
state, workers are to some extent willing to take a wage cut, by lowering their fair wage, in order to
help them out.
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which characterizes how the fair wage in this economy evolves over time.
2.4 The equilibrium wage adjustment
We assume perfect market competition among firms, each of which acts as a price-
taker in the goods market. Let P (t) denote the aggregate price of the good. At time
t ∈ T , each firm unilaterally offers a wage w(i, t) to its employed workers, taking the
sequence of all the aggregate variables {W (s), P (s), x(s)}ts=−∞ as given. This means
that each firm also takes the fair wage ω(t) as given when it offers its own wage. Since
the cost of unemployment is prohibitively large, there is a fine line between X(t) < 1
and X(t) = 1, and the nature of wage setting differs completely depending on whether
the economy achieves full employment or not.
We first characterize the equilibrium wage adjustment process in the presence of
unemployment, i.e., X(t) < 1. In this case, workers are completely immobile and have
no choice but to accept wages offered by their respective firms. While bargaining power
is entirely in the hands of firms, workers can withhold work effort whenever they feel
they are slighted. With this fairness concern as a credible threat, firms can lower the
wages only down to the fair wage level. The following is a formal representation of this
fact.
Proposition 1 When X(t) < 1, w(i, t) = ω(t) for all i ∈ [0, 1].
Proof: First, if firm i chooses to hire a worker, it must be that w(i, t) ≥ ω(t). To see
this, note that if ω(t) > w(i, t) > 0, the worker who never quits produces nothing and
consequently yields a negative profit. It is then strictly better not to hire the worker
in the first place. Second, it is also straightforward to see that firms have no incentive
ex post to offer a wage that is strictly larger than the fair wage, because that would
only decrease their profits. It follows from these observations that firms simply offer
the fair wage at every instance when X(t) < 1.
Q.E.D.
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The proposition means that the evolution of the fair wage totally dictates the
equilibrium wage dynamics in the presence of unemployment. First, since w(i, t) = ω(t)
for all i, we have W (t) = ω(t) for any given weight {σ(i)}1i=0. It then follows from (3)
and (6) that
W (t0) =W (t0 −∆t)(1− α∆t) +W (t0)x(t0)∆t. (7)
The equilibrium wage dynamics is governed by this adjustment process. Letting ∆t→
0, we obtain
W˙ (t0)
W (t0)
= lim∆t→0
W (t0)−W (t0 −∆t)
W (t0 −∆t)∆t = lim∆t→0
x(t0)− α
1− x(t0)∆t = x(t0)− α. (8)
The nature of wage setting drastically changes once the economy achieves full em-
ployment, i.e., X(t) = 1. Workers are now fully mobile in search of the best wage
offer available to them without facing any risk of being unemployed. Consequently,
the market price P (t) dictates the equilibrium dynamics, and the fair wage may play
no role. Since workers are mobile, competition among firms for workers drives up the
wage offers up to θP (t). We can thus establish the following result.
Proposition 2 When X(t) = 1, w(i, t) = θP (t) for all i ∈ [0, 1].
Proof: First, it is evident that no firm offers w(i, t) > θP (t) because it yields a
strictly negative profit. Suppose that θP (t) > wmax ≡ maxiw(i, t). Then, a firm can
offer a wage that is slightly larger than wmax and attract all workers away from other
firms. This means that the only equilibrium with perfect worker mobility is to offer
w(i, t) = θP (t).
Q.E.D.
In either case, whether there is unemployment or not, w(i, t) =W (t) for all i ∈ [0, 1].
Perfect market competition then forces all firms to break even and earn zero profit in
equilibrium. The following zero-profit condition thus always holds:
θP (t) =W (t). (9)
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3 General equilibrium
In the previous section, we have derived the nominal wage adjustment process which
stems from workers’ fairness concerns. We now incorporate this process into a dynamic
general equilibrium framework which admits the possibility of equilibrium unemploy-
ment.
The problem we consider is a standard dynamic money-in-utility optimization prob-
lem (in what follows, we abbreviate time notation to simplify exposition). The lifetime
utility of a representative household is given by
U =
Z ∞
0
[u(c) + v(m)] exp(−ρt)dt, (10)
where ρ is the subjective discount rate, c is real consumption and m ≡ M/P is real
money balances. The representative household maximizes U subject to the flow budget
equation:
m˙ = wX − πm− c− z, (11)
where π is the inflation rate, z is the lump-sum tax-cum-subsidy and w is the real
wage W/P. Since all firms earn zero profit under perfect market competition, the
only storable asset in this economy is the real balances m.15 The first-order optimal
condition of this problem is
η c˙
c
+ ρ+ π = v
0(m)
u0(c)
where η ≡ −u
00(c)c
u0(c)
, (12)
and the transversality condition is
lim
t→∞λ(t)m(t) exp(−ρt) = 0, (13)
where λ(t) is the costate variable of m which equals u0(c).
The government’s budget constraint is
z + μm = g, (14)
15Even if there are government bonds, the present analysis is unchanged since the Ricardian equiv-
alence holds.
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where g represents government purchases and μ is the monetary expansion rate:
M˙
M
= μ. (15)
Given the definition of m, this can also be written as
m˙
m
= μ− π. (16)
The general equilibrium properties of the model differ sharply, depending on whether
there is unemployment or not. In the presence of unemployment, (8) and (9) give
π = W˙
W
= x(t)− α. (17)
On any equilibrium path, all employed workers are motivated enough to exert effort
and hence the total production is always θX, as discussed in the previous section.
Therefore, under perfect commodity price adjustment, we must have
c+ g = θX. (18)
From (2), (12) and the time derivative of (18),
v0(m)
u0(c)
− π − ρ = η
µ
c+ g
c
¶³ x
X
− α
´
. (19)
Combined with (17) and (18), (19) yields
P˙
P
= π = c
c+ θη
µ
v0(m)
u0(c)
− ρ+ αηθ
c
(
c+ g
θ − 1)
¶
, (20)
which is our version of the Phillips curve. Substituting (20) into (12) and (16) and
rearranging the results produces
m˙
m
= μ− c
c+ θη
µ
v0(m)
u0(c)
− ρ+ αηθ
c
(
c+ g
θ − 1)
¶
,
c˙
c
=
θ
c+ θη
µ
v0(m)
u0(c)
− ρ− α(c+ gθ − 1)
¶
. (21)
These two equations constitute an autonomous dynamic system with respect to m and
c in the presence of unemployment.
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Remark: Under the current Phillips curve (20), the inflation rate is governed by the
liquidity premium v0(m)/u0(c), the subjective discount rate ρ and the unemployment
rate 1− (c+ g)/θ. More importantly, substituting (12) into this, we obtain
π = c˙θ + α(
c+ g
θ − 1). (22)
This indicates that as the economy approaches the steady state (c˙→ 0), the inflation
rate depends solely on the unemployment rate. The current framework hence provides
a microeconomic foundation for the relationship between the unemployment rate and
the inflation rate, as the original Phillips curve posits.
If full employment is realized (X = 1), on the other hand, we have
c = θ − g. (23)
From (12), (16) and (23), we obtain
m˙
m
= ρ+ μ− v
0(m)
u0(θ − g) ,
which is the same as the standard dynamics of the money-in-utility model (see e.g.
Blanchard and Fischer, 1989). From the beginning, therefore, P takes the level that
satisfies
ρ+ μ = v
0(M/P )
u0(θ − g) , (24)
and thereafter rises at the same pace as μ, so that M/P remains at the constant level
that satisfies (24). From (9), θP = W and hence W also rises at the rate of μ. Thus,
in this case the Phillips curve forms a vertical line as μ changes.
4 Temporary Unemployment
Using the dynamic equations obtained in the previous section we draw the phase dia-
gram and analyze the properties of the present dynamics. This section first considers
the case with no liquidity trap, where the marginal utility of liquidity has no positive
13
lowerbound, i.e., limm→0 v0(m) = 0, so that the demand for liquidity would eventu-
ally dissipate. Under this condition, any equilibrium path reaches the full-employment
steady state and unemployment occurs only during the adjustment process.
From (21), the boundary curve of m dynamics and that of c dynamics are given by
m˙ = 0: v0(m) =
µ
ρ− θηα
c
(
c+ g
θ − 1) + μ(1 +
θη
c
)
¶
u0(c).
c˙ = 0: v0(m) =
µ
ρ+ α(c+ gθ − 1)
¶
u0(c). (25)
The right-hand side of the m˙ = 0 curve is obviously a decreasing function with respect
to c whereas the right-hand side of the c˙ = 0 curve can be sloped either positively or
negatively. If the aggregate demand c + g is less than the full-employment supply θ,
and μ is non-negative, the right-hand side of the m˙ = 0 curve is larger than that of the
c˙ = 0 curve. Thus, since v00(m) < 0, the m˙ = 0 curve is located on the left-hand side
of the c˙ = 0 curve. Figure 1 illustrates the two curves in the case where the right-hand
side of the c˙ = 0 curve is negatively sloped and hence the c˙ = 0 curve is positively
sloped.16 If μ = 0, the intersection point of the two curves is given by (23) and (24),
which is A in the figure. Therefore, there is a unique saddle path that converges to
A, which we refer to as the full-employment path. Along the path deflation gradually
declines and eventually becomes zero.
If μ > 0, on the other hand, the steady state given by (21) does not exist within the
range where c+ g ≤ θ. This is illustrated in figure 2. Then, along the full-employment
path, the economy reaches E, at which (23) and (24) are valid, within a finite time
and thereafter stays there. As the figure shows, an increase in μ lowers m but leaves
c unaffected in the new steady state. Therefore, if μ unexpectedly increases when the
economy passes through B, it jumps up to D and thereafter follows DE. Eventually,
it reaches E, where the inflation rate is μ: an increase in μ is hence translated into
an one-for-one increase in the inflation rate. If the monetary authority reduces the
monetary expansion rate to zero in the new steady state so as to stabilize prices,
16When g = 0, it is valid if ηρ > α and ρ > α. Note that a positively sloped unique saddle path
obtains even if the boundary curve is negatively sloped.
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private consumption stagnates in the short run, as the economy jumps down to F and
moves along FA. The monetary authority thus faces the short-run tradeoff between
inflation and consumption. It should gradually and intermittently decrease μ so as to
avoid a sudden downward spike in private consumption.
The effect of an increase in the government purchases g is illustrated in figure 3.
From (21), around the full-employment steady state where c = θ − g, the dynamics of
m and c are given by
m˙
m
=
ηθμ
θ − g + θη and
c˙
c
=
θμ
θ − g + θη ,
and hence on the equilibrium path c and m move so that they satisfy
m
c
dc
dm
¯¯¯¯
path
=
c˙/c
m˙/m
=
1
η . (26)
From (23) and (24), on the other hand, the change in the steady state induced by an
increase in g must satisfy
m
c
dc
dm
¯¯¯¯
steady state
=
ηm
η where ηm = −
v00(m)m
v0(m)
(> 0), (27)
where ηm is the elasticity of money utility. By comparing (26) and (27), we find that
an increase in g shifts the steady state from E to B if ηm < 1 and to D if ηm > 1, as
illustrated in figure 3. In either case, an increase in g leads to a one-for-one decrease
in c in the long run (complete crowding out). In the short run, however, it may or
may not stimulate private consumption, depending on the elasticity of money utility: c
increases if the elasticity is smaller than one and decreases if the elasticity is larger than
one, since B and D are respectively located above and below the previous equilibrium
path. If a fiscal expansion occurs at A, the path jumps to either F or H and thereafter
traces the new saddle path.
To sum up, along the full-employment path, any government interventions, either
monetary or fiscal, affect aggregate demand in the short run, one way or the other.
Since the economy eventually reaches full employment, however, any policies have only
a transitory effect as market forces bring the economy back on track in the long run.
We summarize our findings as follows.
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Proposition 3 If the marginal utility of liquidity has no positive lowerbound, i.e.,
limm→∞ v0(m) = 0, there is a unique equilibrium path that reaches the full-employment
steady state. Along the full-employment path,
• a monetary expansion raises private consumption in the short run, while it does not
affect private consumption in the long run,
• a fiscal expansion totally crowds out private consumption in the long run, while it
may or may not increase private consumption in the short run.
5 Persistent unemployment
We have so far examined the case where the full-employment steady state, given by
(23) and (24), exists and is eventually reached. Under certain conditions, however,
our model also admits the possibility of persistent unemployment where the full-
employment steady state fails to exist. In this case, market forces alone are not
sufficient to bring the economy back on track, and the government may have some
role to play, even in the long run. It should be noted that the presence of persistent
unemployment in this economy is not caused by real wage rigidity which tips the bal-
ance on the supply side of the market: although wages are sluggish due to fairness
concerns, prices are fully flexible so that the real wage rate is always equal to the
marginal productivity, i.e., θ = w(= W/P ) from (9). It rather arises as a monetary
phenomenon driven purely from the demand side.
5.1 Cases for insatiable liquidity preferences
The money demand curve is given by the relationship between m and the liquidity
premium v0(m)/u0(c), which represents the nominal interest rate. It is negatively sloped
since the liquidity premium decreases as m increases. We now introduce a liquidity
trap to this, which arises if v0(m) has a positive lowerbound:
lim
m→∞ v
0(m) = β > 0. (28)
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There is an indication that this property captures what Keynes envisioned as an essence
of a monetary economy, i.e., an economy in which there is an asset whose marginal
utility stays positive (Keynes, 1936, chap.17).17 As demonstrated in Ono (1994, 2001)
and also in this model, this constant and perpetual craving for money can be a driving
force for persistent demand shortages. Here, we offer two interpretations to justify this
assumption.
Money as a secondary reward: One interpretation is to take the presence of the
lowerbound literally as a formal representation of our perpetual craving for liquid as-
sets, viz. money. Although the assumption of this kind is somewhat non-standard in
modern macroeconomics, we argue that it is not as provocative as some may think:
after all, there is no firm scientific ground to believe that the marginal utility of money
should converge to zero either. To make a case for this interpretation, we focus on the
nature of money as a reward as opposed to other rewards, called “primary rewards”
in neuroscience, that are indispensable for the survival of the species. This distinc-
tion, which is clearly made in neuroscience, is potentially important in economics as
well because that should have deep connection to the way we specify preferences for
“secondary rewards” such as money, power and fame.18
The satiable nature of the demand for primary rewards such as food is intuitively
clear. For instance, we all know from our experiences that if we eat enough, the mar-
ginal value of food eventually diminishes to zero and even negative. The assumption
of the form limc→∞ u0(c) = 0, which is fairly conventional in economics, is presumably
meant to capture this gut intuition. This does not necessarily mean, though, that we
can apply this same logic to secondary rewards which derive their value from their
associated primary rewards. The difference is clear at a superficial level: money is not
something we directly consume but something we learn to appreciate though the asso-
17Using aggregate quarterly data in Japan and the Japanese survey data called NIKKEI RADAR,
Ono, Ogawa and Yoshida (2004) empirically find this property to be well supported using both para-
metric and non-parametric methods.
18In neuroscience, Izuma et al. (2008) show that the brain areas activated by social rewards (ac-
quisition of good reputation) overlap with those activated by monetary rewards.
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ciation between money and consumption. There is no convincing reason to believe that
our gut intuition about our appetite, or any other more instinctive needs for primary
rewards, should directly be applied to our craving for money as a secondary reward:
at the very least, we never get tired of accumulating wealth in the same way as we get
tired of eating food. In fact, evidence in neuroscience suggests that the diminishing
nature of marginal utility, called “devaluation” in the field, for primary and secondary
rewards is represented in different brain areas: the orbitofrontal cortex (limbic area)
for primary rewards and the dorsal striatum (cognitive area) for secondary rewards.19
Although research along this line is still at its infant stage and there remains a lot to
be seen, these findings seem to confirm a belief that the valuation of secondary rewards
is related more to human cognition whereas that of primary rewards is related more
to sheer instinct, indicating that simplistic analogy between primary and secondary
rewards is not necessarily warranted.
Other-regarding preferences: An alternative interpretation, which is more widely
accepted in economics, is to see this as a consequence of other-regarding preferences,
such as the preference for “status” or the fear of lagging behind.20 Suppose, for instance,
that agents are “status-seeking” in that they gain utility from the difference in wealth
holdings. In this case, we can replace v(m) by v(m −m) where m denotes the social
average of m. Since agents are all homogeneous and m always equals m in the present
setting, v0(m−m) stays to be fixed at v0(0) for any level of m. Our assumption (28)
then follows if we let this value be β.
19Evidence, based on both animal studies (Ballein and Dickinson, 1998, 2000; Ballein and Ostlund,
2007) and human studies (Valentin et al., 2007), suggests that the orbitofrontal cortex is the region
responsible for the devaluation of primary rewards. Research on the devaluation of secondary rewards
is relatively scarce, but Pine et al. (2009) recently finds that the devaluation of secondary rewards is
represented in the dorsal striatum. We thank S. Tanaka for enlightening us on the subject.
20See, for instance, Clark and Oswald (1998) for an extensive survey on the “status” literature.
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5.2 Dynamics under insatiable liquidity preferences
We now characterize equilibrium dynamics under (28). If the full-employment supply
θ is sufficiently large and satisfies
β
u0(θ − g) > ρ+ μ, (29)
the liquidity premium exceeds the time preference for any m whenever c attains its
full-employment level. This means that there exists no m that can satisfy (24) and
hence the full-employment steady state fails to exist. In this case, along the boundary
curve of c given in (25), c gradually approaches cu defined by
Ru ≡ β
u0(cu)
= ρ+ α(c
u + g
θ − 1). (30)
If μ is sufficiently small, there exists an equilibrium path that leads to this stagnation
steady state (the stagnation path, for short) which satisfies the transversality condition.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the marginal utility of liquidity has a positive lowerbound,
i.e., limm→∞ v0(m) = β > 0. If (29) holds, the full-employment steady state does not
exist. Moreover, if μ is small enough to satisfy
β
u0(cu)
> μ,
there arises a unique equilibrium path that leads to the stagnation steady state. Along
the stagnation path, the steady-state consumption level converges to cu which falls short
of the full-employment level θ − g and deflation occurs.
Proof: We can show that there exists a well-defined cu such that
0 < cu < θ − g.
To see this, define the difference of the two sides of (30) as
Φ(c) ≡ β
u0(c)
− ρ− α(c+ gθ − 1),
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which is continuous in c. The intermediate-value theorem then guarantees the existence
of a well-defined cu if
Φ(θ − g) > 0 > lim
c→0Φ(c) = −ρ− α(
g
θ − 1).
The first inequality directly follows from (29) whereas the second inequality holds by
assumption. This property also implies Φ0(c) > 0 around the stagnation steady state
(where Φ(c) = 0) and hence
ηβθ
cuu0(cu)
(=
ηRuθ
cu
) > α. (31)
Since Φ(c) is the inside value of the parenthesis of c˙/c in (21) when the stagnation
steady state is reached, the boundary curve of the c dynamics is positively sloped with
respect to c around the stagnation steady state, as illustrated in figure 4. From (20)
and (30) the steady-state inflation rate is then obtained as
πu = α(c
u + g
θ − 1) < 0. (32)
From (21), (30) and (32), the transversality condition (13) is valid if and only if
0 >
m˙
m
− ρ = μ− β
u0(cu)
. (33)
Evidently, this condition holds when μ is sufficiently small.
Q.E.D.
This situation is depicted in figure 4. In sum, on the equilibrium path, the economy
never reaches the full-employment steady state. Along the stagnation path, the price
level continuously falls, resulting in persistent deflation which makes the real balances
m keep expanding while satisfying the transversality condition. The consumption level
falls short of the full-employment level θ− g and, due to this insufficient level of aggre-
gate demand, unemployment persists in the steady state. Note that cu given by (30)
is decreasing in α, meaning that a recession becomes severer as the wage adjustment
becomes less sluggish, since an improvement in the wage adjustment worsens deflation
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and makes holding money less costly. In the current setup, therefore, the role of nomi-
nal rigidity differs fundamentally from the conventional New Keynesian models where
nominal rigidity is the direct cause of demand shortages.21
5.3 Fiscal and monetary policies
We are now in a position to draw policy implications in the stagnation phase with per-
sistent unemployment. We start with the effect of a monetary expansion on aggregate
demand. An important observation here is that cu is independent of μ, so that a change
in μ does not affect either the upper bound of c or the steady-state inflation rate as
long as μ satisfies (29) and (33). This fact leads to a serious implication regarding the
effectiveness of monetary policies in the stagnation phase.
There are two cases we need to consider, but the implications are roughly the same.
Suppose first that cu is not much smaller than the full-employment level θ − g such
that
β
u0(θ − g) − ρ <
β
u0(cu)
, (34)
It then follows from (29) and (33) that
μ < β
u0(θ − g) − ρ ⇒ stagnation,
β
u0(θ − g) − ρ < μ <
β
u0(cu)
⇒ both stagnation and full employment,
β
u0(cu)
< μ⇒ full employment.
Only the stagnation path exists when μ is relatively small (less than β/u0(θ− g)− ρ).
Since cu is independent of μ, this means that a small change in μ is totally ineffec-
tive when the economy is in this state. This situation is illustrated in figure 5. Once
the monetary authority raises μ enough to violate (29) and hence enable m to vali-
date (24), the full-employment steady state, represented by E in figure 6, is restored.
Consequently, there emerges a new equilibrium path given by BE which leads to the
21As mentioned at the outset of this section, the real wage always equals the marginal productivity
of labor θ due to perfect flexibility of commodity prices, so that there is no real rigidity in our model.
21
full-employment steady state. Note, however, that the stagnation path AU also exists
in this range. In the presence of multiple paths, there is no guarantee that the econ-
omy jumps to the new full-employment path, because it requires coordination among
all agents. This means that the monetary authority needs an extra push, if it is to put
an end to persistent stagnation. This can in fact be done by raising μ even higher, in
which case only the full-employment path survives. A policy intervention of this kind
apparently comes with a cost, however, as the economy necessarily suffers from high
inflation. The classic dilemma between inflation and unemployment surfaces, now with
a long-run implication: if it reduces μ in order to stabilize prices, the full-employment
steady state disappears and the economy returns to the stagnation path AU which
results in persistent unemployment.
On the other hand, if cu is much smaller than θ − g and
β
u0(θ − g) − ρ >
β
u0(cu)
,
we find
μ < β
u0(cu)
⇒ stagnation,
β
u0(cu)
< μ < β
u0(θ − g) − ρ⇒ no equilibrium path,
β
u0(θ − g) − ρ < μ⇒ full employment.
The situation is the same in the case above when μ is either relatively small (less
than β/u0(cu)) or relatively large (β/u0(θ− g)− ρ): only the stagnation path exists in
the former case while only the full-employment path exists in the latter. There is a
difference in the case in-between: no equilibrium path exists in this intermediate range.
Even in this case, though, we can draw the same conclusion: a modest increase in μ is
totally ineffective and of no help to get the economy out of the stagnation phase.
We now turn to the effect of a fiscal expansion along the stagnation path which is
also drastically different from that along the full-employment path. This is illustrated
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in figure 7. Since (30) and (31) yield
dcu
dg
=
α³ ηβθ
cuu0(cu) − α
´ > 0,
the equilibrium path shifts upward from AF to DH and thus c rises in both the short
run (from B to D) and the long run (from cu to cu0). If the government expands g
sufficiently to satisfy
ρ > β
u0(θ − g) ,
as in the case of g2, the full-employment steady state, K in the figure, is eventually
reached. It should be noted that if the government reduces g to the previous level, the
consumption c returns to the previous level as well. In order to maintain a high level
of consumption, the government must continuously hold g at the same level.
Since market forces cannot be relied upon to restore full employment automatically,
the role of the government is inherently different in the stagnation phase. Government
interventions are not only effective, even in the long run, but also indispensable to
realize full employment. We summarize our findings as follows.
Proposition 5 Along the stagnation path,
• a modest monetary expansion is totally ineffective and has no impact on neither pri-
vate consumption nor the inflation rate,
• a substantial monetary expansion may restore full employment, although it necessar-
ily entails high inflation,
• a fiscal expansion raises private consumption, in both the short run and the long run.
6 Conclusion
We incorporate various concepts of fairness to the fair wage model of Akerlof and Yellen
(1990) and extend it to a dynamic general equilibrium model of a monetary economy
as portrayed by Keynes (1936, chap.17). In this “Akerlof-Yellen meets Keynes” frame-
work, we derive a version of the Phillips curve with its microeconomic foundation.
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We show that the inflation rate is governed by the liquidity premium, the subjective
discount rate and the unemployment rate; around the steady state, in particular, it
depends on the unemployment rate only, as in the original Phillips curve. More im-
portantly, we also show that unemployment due to demand shortages may arise in
the steady state. Effects of monetary and fiscal expansions are very different between
under temporary unemployment and under persistent unemployment.
An increase in the monetary expansion rate raises short-run aggregate demand
when the economy is on the full-employment path, although the steady-state aggregate
demand is unaffected. If demand shortages occur under persistent stagnation, on the
other hand, a modest increase in the monetary expansion rate is totally ineffective
in stimulating aggregate demand. The monetary expansion rate must be significantly
high to get the economy out of persistent stagnation. This obviously comes with a cost,
however, since the economy inevitably suffers from high inflation once full employment
is realized.
The effect of an increase in government purchases is also quite different between
under temporary unemployment and under persistent stagnation. An increase in gov-
ernment purchases can either increase or decrease private consumption in the short
run, depending on the elasticity of money utility, when the economy is on the full-
employment path: if the elasticity is higher (resp. lower) than one, it increases (resp.
decreases) private consumption in the short run. Since the economy eventually restores
full employment, though, an increase in government purchases totally crowds out pri-
vate consumption in the long run. In contrast, under persistent stagnation, an increase
in government purchases never fails to increase private consumption in both the short
run and the long run.
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Appendix: Stability under persistent stagnation
This appendix shows the saddle-path stability of the dynamics. In the case where the
full-employment steady state exists, there is a unique equilibrium path since the present
model has essentially the same structure as the standard money-in-utility model. Thus,
we focus on the stability when the economy is on the path that leads to the stagnation
steady state.
For simplicity, we consider the case where μ = 0 and g = 0. Since m diverges
to infinity, we consider h(= 1/m) instead of m and examine the stability of the two
dynamic equations derived from (21):
h˙ =
c
c+ θη
µ
v0(1/h)
u0(c)
− ρ+ αη(1− θ
c
)
¶
h,
c˙ =
θc
c+ θη
µ
v0(1/h)
u0(c)
− ρ− α( cθ − 1)
¶
,
around the stagnation steady state where c = cu and h = 0. The partial derivatives of
the above two equations around the stagnation steady state are
∂h˙
∂h = π
u +
cuηmRu
cu + θη ,
∂h˙
∂c = h× d
∙
c
c+ θη
µ β
u0(c)
− ρ+ αη(1− θ
c
)
¶¸
/dc
∂c˙
∂c =
ηRuθ − αcu
cu + θη ,
∂c˙
∂h =
θcuηmRu
(cu + θη)h.
Since ηm = 0 because of the liquidity trap, from (31) and (32), we find
(
∂h˙
∂h)(
∂c˙
∂c)− (
∂h˙
∂c )(
∂c˙
∂h) =
(ηRuθ − αcu)πu
cu + θη < 0,
i.e., one of the characteristic roots is positive and the other is negative. Note that c
is jumpable whereas h(= 1/m = P/M) is not since W is not jumpable and P = W/θ
from (9). We can thus conclude that the path is saddle-path stable.
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Figure 5: Monetary Expansion under Persistent Stagnation 
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Figure 6: Monetary Expansion under Persistent Stagnation 
(when  is large.) 
cu 
c 
c = 0 
O 
m 
m = 0 
)(
)(
gu
mv

 = + 
 
E
A
U 
B 
 g 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
cu 
c 
c = 0 (g = 0) 
O 
m 
cu 
Figure 7: Fiscal Expansion under Persistent Stagnation 
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